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Owing to the worldwide shortage of deceased-donor organs for transplantation, liv-
ing donations have become a significant source of transplant organs. However, not all
willing donors can donate to their intended recipients because of medical incompatibil-
ities. These incompatibilities can be overcome by an exchange of donors between pa-
tients. For kidneys, such exchanges have become widespread in the last decade with the
introduction of optimization and market design techniques to kidney exchange. A small
but growing number of liver exchanges have also been conducted. Over the last two
decades, a number of transplantation procedures emerged where organs from two liv-
ing donors are transplanted to a single patient. Prominent examples include dual-graft
liver transplantation, lobar lung transplantation, and simultaneous liver-kidney trans-
plantation. Exchange, however, has been neither practiced nor introduced in this con-
text. We introduce dual-donor organ exchange as a novel transplantation modality, and
through simulations show that living-donor transplants can be significantly increased
through such exchanges. We also provide a simple theoretical model for dual-donor
organ exchange and introduce optimal exchange mechanisms under various logistical
constraints.
KEYWORDS: Market design, matching, complementarities, lung exchange, dual-graft
liver exchange, simultaneous liver-kidney exchange.
1. INTRODUCTION
MOST TRANSPLANTS FROM LIVING DONORS REQUIRE only one donor for each procedure.
There are, however, exceptions, including dual-graft liver transplantation, bilateral living-
donor lobar lung transplantation, and simultaneous liver-kidney transplantation. For each
of these procedures, grafts from two compatible living donors are transplanted. As such,
these procedures are more involved from an organizational perspective than those with
only one donor. Unfortunately, one or both of the donors can often be biologically incom-
patible with the intended recipient, precluding the transplantation. One way to overcome
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this potential barrier to transplantation is by an exchange of donors between patients.
In addition to now-widespread kidney exchange, a small but growing number of (single-
graft) liver exchanges have been conducted since the introduction of this transplanta-
tion modality in South Korea in 2003 (Hwang et al. (2010)). Despite the introduction
of two-donor transplantation techniques, living-donor organ exchange has not yet been
practiced, or even introduced, for these procedures. In this paper, we fill this gap as we
1. introduce dual-donor organ exchange as a potential transplantation modality for
(a) dual-graft liver transplantation,
(b) bilateral living-donor lobar lung transplantation, and
(c) simultaneous liver-kidney transplantation,
2. simulate the gains from exchange based on data from South Korea (for the applica-
tions of of dual-graft liver transplantation and simultaneous liver-kidney transplantation)
and Japan (for the application of bilateral living-donor lobar lung transplantation),1
3. develop a model of dual-donor organ exchange, and
4. introduce exchange mechanisms under various logistical constraints.
As in kidney exchange, all operations in dual-donor organ exchange have to be carried
out simultaneously. This practice ensures that no donor donates an organ or a lobe un-
less his intended recipient receives a transplant. As such, organization of these exchanges
is not an easy task: A 2-way exchange involves six simultaneous operations, a 3-way ex-
change involves nine simultaneous operations, and so on. As shown by Roth, Sönmez, and
Ünver (2007), most of the gains from kidney exchange can be obtained by exchanges that
are no larger than 3-way. In this paper, we show that this is not the case for dual-donor
organ exchange. Our simulations suggest that the number of transplants from larger than
3-way exchanges can approach to the number of transplants from 2-way and 3-way ex-
changes combined (see Table II). Therefore, exploring the structure of optimal exchange
mechanisms is important under various constraints on the size of feasible exchanges.
Our model builds on the kidney-exchange model of Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2004,
2007). Medical literature2 suggests that a living donor can donate an organ or a lobe to a
patient if he is
1. blood-type compatible with the patient for the cases of kidney transplantation, liver
transplantation, and lung transplantation,
2. size-compatible (in the sense that the donor is at least as large as the patient) for the
cases of single-graft liver transplantation and lobar lung transplantation, and
3. tissue-type compatible for the case of kidney transplantation.
For our simulations, we take all relevant compatibility requirements into consideration in
order to assess the potential welfare gains from dual-donor organ exchange under vari-
ous constraints. For our analytical results on optimal exchange mechanisms, we consider
a simplified model with blood-type compatibility only. With this modeling choice, our an-
alytical model captures all essential features of dual-graft liver transplantation and lobar
lung transplantation for pediatric patients, but it is only an approximation for the ap-
plications of lobar lung transplantation for adult patients and simultaneous liver-kidney
transplantation. Focusing on blood-type compatibility alone allows us to define each pa-
1Simulations are conducted for countries where the respective transplantation modality is most prominent.
2For commonly practiced compatibility requirements, see Lee et al. (2001) and Florman and Miller (2006)
for liver transplantation and McLean, Barr, and Starnes (2007) and Van Raemdonck et al. (2009) for lung
transplantation. The need for tissue-type compatibility for kidney transplantation is well established, while
tissue-type compatibility is not required in general for liver transplantation (Cecka, Zhang, and Reed (2005)).
There is no well-established protocol on tissue-type compatibility for lung transplantation.
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FIGURE 1.—Possible 2-way exchanges. Each patient (denoted by P) and her paired donors (each denoted
by D) are represented in an ellipse. Carried donations in each exchange are represented by directed line seg-
ments. On the left, each patient swaps both of her donors with the other patient. On the right, each patient swaps
a single donor with the other patient and receives a graft from her other donor.
tient as a triple of blood types (one for the patient and two for her incompatible donors),
making our model analytically tractable.
While there are important similarities between kidney exchange and dual-donor organ
exchange, there are also major differences. From an analytical perspective, the most im-
portant difference is the presence of two donors for each patient rather than only one as in
the case of kidney exchange. For each patient, the two donors are perfect complements.3
This key difference makes the dual-donor organ exchange model analytically more de-
manding than the (single-donor) kidney-exchange model. Even organizing an individual
exchange becomes a richer problem under dual-donor organ exchange. For kidney ex-
change, each exchange (regardless of the size of the exchange) has a cycle configuration,
where the donor of each patient donates a kidney to the next patient in the cycle. For
dual-donor organ exchange, there are two configurations for a 2-way exchange (see Fig-
ure 1), five configurations for a 3-way exchange (see Figure 2), and so on. The richness of
exchange configurations in our model also means that the optimal organization of these
exchanges will be more challenging than for kidney exchange. Despite this technical chal-
lenge, we provide optimal mechanisms for (i) 2-way exchanges, (ii) 2-way and 3-way ex-
changes, and (iii) unrestricted exchanges (in Appendix E of the Supplemental Material
(Ergin, Sönmez, and Ünver (2017))).
Due to compatibility requirements between a patient and each of her donors, living
donation for dual-donor procedures proves to be a challenge to arrange even for patients
with willing donors. But this friction also suggests that the role of an organized exchange
can be more prominent for these procedures than for single-donor procedures. Our sim-
ulations in Section 3 and Appendix B of the Supplemental Material (Ergin, Sönmez, and
Ünver (2017)) confirm this insight. An organized lung exchange in Japan has the po-
tential to increase the number of living-donor lung transplants through 2-way and 3-way
exchanges by 134–200%, saving as many as 40 additional lung patients annually (see last
line of Table II in Section 3.1 and Table V in Appendix B.1 in the Supplemental Ma-
terial). Even though dual-graft liver transplantation is a secondary option to single-graft
liver transplantation, an organized dual-graft liver exchange has a potential to increase the
number of living-donor liver transplants by 23–30% through 2-way and 3-way exchanges,
3In matching literature, there are not many models that can incorporate complementarities and find positive
results. Most of the matching literature focuses on various substitutability conditions and shows negative re-
sults even in the existence of slight complementarities in preferences. For example, see Hatfield and Milgrom
(2005), Hatfield and Kojima (2008), and Hatfield and Kominers (2016).
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FIGURE 2.—Possible 3-way exchanges. On the upper-left, each patient trades one donor in a clockwise trade
and the other donor in a counterclockwise trade. On the upper-right, each patient trades both of her donors in
clockwise trades. On the lower-left, each patient trades one donor in a clockwise exchange and receives a graft
from her other donor. On the middle, one patient is treated asymmetrically with respect to the other two: one
patient trades both of her donors in two 2-way trades, one with one patient, the other with the other patient,
while each of the other patients receives a graft from her remaining donor. On the lower-right, all patients are
treated asymmetrically: one patient receives from one of her own donors, and one patient’s donors both donate
to a single patient, while the last patient’s donors donate to the other two patients.
saving nearly 230–300 additional liver patients in South Korea alone (see the last line of
Table IV in Section 3.2 and Table VI in Appendix B.2.
Increasingly, economists are taking advantage of advances in technology to design new
or improved allocation mechanisms in applications as diverse as entry-level labor mar-
kets (Roth and Peranson (1999)), spectrum auctions (Milgrom (2000)), internet auctions
(Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007), Varian (2007)), school choice (Abdulkadirog˘lu
and Sönmez (2003)), kidney exchange (Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2004, 2005, 2007)),
course allocation (Sönmez and Ünver (2010), Budish and Cantillon (2012)), affirmative
action (Kojima (2012), Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim (2013), Echenique and Yenmez
(2015)), cadet-branch matching (Sönmez and Switzer (2013), Sönmez (2013)), refugee
matching (Moraga and Rapoport (2014), Jones and Teytelboym (2016)), and assignment
of arrival slots (Schummer and Vohra (2013), Schummer and Abizada (2017)). Our pa-
per contributes to the emerging field of market design by introducing a new application
in dual-donor organ exchange, and also to transplantation literature by introducing three
novel transplantation modalities.
2. BACKGROUND FOR APPLICATIONS
There are four human blood types, O, A, B, and AB, denoting the existence or ab-
sence of the two blood proteins A or B in the human blood. A patient can receive a
donor’s transplant organ (or a lobe of an organ), unless the donor carries a blood protein
that the patient does not have. Thus, in the absence of other requirements, O patients can
receive a transplant from only O donors, A patients can receive a transplant from A and
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O donors, B patients can receive a transplant from B and O donors, and AB patients can
receive a transplant from all donors. For some of our applications, there are additional
medical requirements. In addition to the background information for each of these appli-
cations, the presence or lack of additional compatibility requirements are discussed be-
low for dual-graft liver transplantation and living-donor lobar lung transplantation. Back-
ground for simultaneous liver-kidney transplantation is discussed in Appendix C of the
Supplemental Material.
2.1. Dual-Graft Liver Transplantation
The liver is the second most common organ for transplantation, after the kidney. Of
nearly 31,000 U.S. transplants in 2015, more than 7000 were liver transplants. While there
is the alternative (albeit inferior) treatment of dialysis for end-stage kidney disease, there
are no alternatives to transplantation for end-stage liver disease. In contrast to western
countries, donations for liver transplantation in much of Asia come from living donors.
For example, in 2015, while only 359 of 7127 liver transplants were from living donors
in the U.S., 942 of 1398 liver transplants were from living donors in South Korea. The
low rates of deceased-donor organ donation in Asia are to a large extent due to cul-
tural reasons and beliefs to respect bodily integrity after death (Lee (2010)). The need
to resort to living-donor liver transplantation arose as a response to the critical shortage
of deceased-donor organs and the increasing demand for liver transplantation in Asia,
where the incidence of end-stage liver disease is very high (Lee et al. (2001)). For simi-
lar reasons, living-donor liver transplantation is also more common than deceased-donor
liver transplantation in several countries with predominantly Muslim populations, such as
Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
A healthy human can donate part of his liver, which typically regenerates within a
month. Donation of the smaller left lobe (normally 30–40% of the liver) or the larger
right lobe (normally 60–70% of the liver) are the two main options. In order to provide
adequate liver function for the patient, at least 40% and preferably 50% of the standard
liver volume of the patient is required. The metabolic demands of a larger patient will
not be met by the smaller left lobe from a relatively small donor. This phenomenon is
referred to as small-for-size syndrome by the transplantation community. The primary so-
lution to avoid this syndrome has been harvesting the larger right lobe of the liver. This
procedure, however, is considerably more risky for the donor than harvesting the much
smaller left lobe.4 Furthermore, for donors with larger than normal-size right lobes, this
option is not feasible.5 Even though the patient receives an adequate graft volume with
right lobe transplantation, the remaining left lobe may not be enough for donor safety.
Thus, unlike deceased-donor whole-size liver transplantation, size matching between the
liver graft and the standard liver volume of the patient has been a major challenge in
adult living-donor liver transplantation due to the importance of providing an adequate
graft mass to the patient while leaving a sufficient mass of remaining liver in the donor to
ensure donor safety.
Dual-graft (or dual-lobe) liver transplantation, a technique that was introduced by
Sung-Gyu Lee at the Asan Medical Center of South Korea in 2000, emerged as a response
4While donor mortality is approximately 0.1% for left lobe donation, it ranges from 0.4% to 0.5% for right
lobe donation (Lee (2010)). Other risks, referred to as donor morbidity, are also considerably higher with right
lobe donation.
5For the donor, at least 30% of the standard liver volume of the donor is required. Beyond this limit, the
remnant liver of the donor loses its ability to compensate, regenerate, and recover (Lee et al. (2001)).
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to the challenges of the more risky right lobe liver transplantation (Lee et al. (2001)). Un-
der this procedure, one (almost always left) liver lobe is removed from each of the two
donors, and they are both transplanted into a patient. In the period 2011–2015, 176 dual-
graft liver transplants were performed in South Korea, with the vast majority at the Asan
Medical Center. Other countries that have performed dual-graft liver transplantation so
far include Brazil, China, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Romania, and Turkey. The pres-
ence of two willing donors (almost always) solves the problem of size matching, rendering
size compatibility inconsequential, but transplantation cannot go through if one or both
donors are blood-type incompatible with the patient. This is where an exchange of donors
can play an important role, making dual-graft liver transplantation an ideal application
for dual-donor organ exchange with blood-type compatibility only. As an interesting side
note, single-lobe liver exchange was introduced in 2003 at the Asan Medical Center, the
same hospital where dual-graft liver transplantation was introduced. As such, it is a natu-
ral candidate to adopt an exchange program for potential dual-graft liver recipients.6
2.2. Living-Donor Lobar Lung Transplantation
As in the case of kidneys and livers, deceased-donor lung donations have not been
able to meet the demand. As a result, thousands of patients worldwide die annually while
waiting for lung transplantation. Living-donor lobar lung transplantation was introduced
in 1990 by Dr. Vaughn Starnes and his colleagues for patients who are too critically ill
to survive the waiting list for deceased-donor lungs. Since then, eligibility for this novel
transplantation modality has been expanded to cystic fibrosis and other end-stage lung
diseases.
A healthy human has five lung lobes: three lobes in the right lung and two in the left.
In a living-donor lobar lung transplantation, two donors each donate a lower lobe to the
patient to replace the patient’s dysfunctional lungs. Each donor must not only be blood-
type compatible with the patient, but, donating only a part of the lung, he should also
weigh at least as much. Hence blood-type compatibility and size compatibility are the two
major medical requirements for living-donor lobar lung transplantation. This makes living
donation much harder to arrange for lungs than for kidneys, even if a patient is able to
find two willing donors.
Sato et al. (2014) reported that there is no significant difference in patient survival
between living-donor and deceased-donor lung transplantations. For a living donor, how-
ever, donation of part of a lung is “more costly” than donation of a kidney or even the
left lobe of a liver. A healthy donor can maintain a normal life with only one kidney. And
the liver regenerates itself within months after a living donation. In contrast, a donated
lung lobe does not regenerate, resulting in a loss of 10–20% of pre-donation lung capac-
ity. In large part due to this discouraging reason, there have been only 15–30 living-donor
lobar lung transplants annually in the U.S. in the period 1994–2004. This already mod-
est rate has essentially diminished in the U.S. over the last decade as the lung allocation
score (LAS) was initiated in May 2005 to allocate lungs on the basis of medical urgency
6From an optimal design perspective, it would be preferable to combine our proposed dual-graft liver ex-
change program with the existing single-graft liver exchange program. When exchanges are restricted to logis-
tically easier 2-way exchanges, such a unification can only be beneficial if a patient is allowed to receive a graft
from a single donor in exchange for grafts from two of her donors. We leave this possibility to potential future
research, in part because an exchange of “two donors for only one donor” has no medical precedence, and it
may be subject to criticism by the medical ethics community.
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and post-transplant survival. Prior to LAS, allocation of deceased-donor lungs was mostly
based on a first-come-first-serve basis.
At present, Japan is the only country with a strong presence in living-donor lung trans-
plantation. In 2013, there were 61 lung transplantations in Japan, of which 20 were from
living donors. Okayama University Hospital has the largest program in Japan, having con-
ducted nearly half of the living-donor lung transplants. Since September 2014, we have
been collaborating with their lung-transplantation team to assess the potential of a lung-
exchange program at Okayama University Hospital.
3. SIMULATIONS
We start our analysis with calibrated simulations to quantify the potential gains from
dual-donor organ exchange.7 Our methodology to generate patients and their attached
donors is similar for all simulations. Each patient is randomly generated according to her
respective population characteristics. For most applications, each patient is attached to
two independently and randomly generated donors.8
The construction of the dual-donor exchange pool depends on the specific application,
the most straightforward one being the case of lung transplantation. For this application,
any patient who is incompatible with one or both of her attached donors is sent to the
exchange pool. Once the exchange pool forms, an optimal algorithm is used to determine
the transplants via exchange to maximize the number of transplants. For liver transplan-
tation, we assume that single-graft transplantation is preferred to dual-graft transplanta-
tion because the former puts only one donor in harm’s way rather than two. Therefore,
for any patient, (i) direct donation from a single donor, (ii) exchange with a single donor,
and (iii) direct donation from two donors will all be attempted in the given order be-
fore the patient is sent to the dual-graft liver-exchange pool.9 We also conduct dynamic
simulations and report their findings in Appendix B of the Supplemental Material.10
3.1. Lung Exchange
Since Japan leads the world in living-donor lung transplantation, we simulate patient-
donor characteristics based on data available from that country. We failed to obtain gen-
der data for Japanese transplant patients. Therefore, we assumed that half of the patient
population is male and the other half is female. We use the aggregate data statistics in Ta-
ble I to calibrate the simulation parameters.11 Each patient-donor-donor triple is specified
7SLK-exchange simulations are reported in Appendix C of the Supplemental Material.
8For the case of simultaneous liver-kidney (SLK) exchange, there are kidney-only and liver-only patients
who are in need of one donor only. A single donor is generated for these patients.
9For the application of SLK transplantation, we consider a scenario where the exchange pool includes not
only SLK patients who are incompatible with one or both of their donors, but also kidney (only) patients and
liver (only) patients with incompatible donors.
10See supplementary files for the Matlab program files and the data files used in simulations.
11For random parameters like height, weight, or left-lobe liver volume percentage in liver transplantation,
we only have the mean and standard deviation of the population distributions. Using these moments, we as-
sume that these variables are distributed by a truncated normal distribution. The choices of the truncation
points are μ ± cσ where μ is the mean, σ is the standard deviation of the distribution, and coefficient c is
set to 3 (a large number chosen not to affect the reported variance of the distributions much). The trun-
cated normal distribution PDF with truncation points for min and max, a and b, respectively, is given as
f (x;μσab) = 1σ φ( x−μσ )
( b−μσ )−( a−μσ )
, where φ and  are the PDF and CDF of standard normal distribution, re-
spectively.
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TABLE I
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR LUNG-EXCHANGE SIMULATIONS
FROM JAPANESE POPULATIONa
Lung Disease Patients 2013
Waitlisted at Arrived/Departed Received
the Beginning During Live-/Deceased-
of the Year the Year Donor Trans.
193 126–146/25–45 20/41
Adult Body Weight (kg.)
Female Mean: 52.9 Std Dev: 9.0
Male Mean: 65.7 Std Dev: 11.1
Composite Mean: 59.3 Std Dev: 10.1
Blood-Type Distribution
O 30.05%
A 40.00%
B 20.00%
AB 9.95%
aThis table reflects the parameters used in calibrating the simulations for
lung exchange. We obtained the blood-type distribution for Japan from the
Japanese Red Cross website http://www.jrc.or.jp/donation/first/knowledge/
index.html on 04/10/2016. The Japanese adult weight distribution’s mean
and standard deviation were obtained from e-Stat of Japan using the 2010
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey from the website https:
//www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/GL02010101.do?method=init on 04/10/2016.
by their blood types and weights. We deem a patient compatible with a donor if the donor
is blood-type compatible with the patient and also as heavy as the patient. We consider
population sizes of n= 10, 20, and 50 for the simulations.
Patients who are compatible with both donors receive two lobes from their own donors
directly, whereas the remaining patients join the exchange pool. Then we find optimal
2-way, 2&3-way, 2–4-way, 2–5-way, and unrestricted matchings.
Simulation results are reported in Table II. When n= 50 (the last two lines), only 126%
of the patients can receive direct donation, and the rest, 874%, participate in exchange
(i.e., the remaining average of 437 patients). Using only 2-way exchange, an additional
10% of the patients can be matched, increasing the number of living-donor transplants by
785% (i.e., 496 divided by 631). Using 2&3-way exchanges, we can increase the number
of living-donor transplants by 135% (i.e., 851 divided by 631). Of course, larger exchange
sizes require more transplant teams to be simultaneously available and can test the limits
of logistical constraints. Subject to this caveat, it is possible to match nearly 25% of all pa-
tients via 2–5-way exchanges, almost tripling the number of living-donor lung transplants.
At the limit, that is, in the absence of restrictions on exchange sizes, a third of the patients
can receive lung transplants through exchanges, facilitating living-donor lung transplan-
tation to nearly 46% of all patients in the population (matching 165 patients in exchange
in addition to the 631 patients who receive direct transplantation).
The effect of the population size on marginal contribution of exchange is very signifi-
cant: For example, the contribution of 2&3-way exchange to living-donor transplantation
reduces from 135% to 30% when the population size reduces from n= 50 to n= 10.
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TABLE II
LUNG-EXCHANGE SIMULATIONSa
Exchange Technology
Population Direct
Size Donation 2-way 2& 3-way 2–4-way 2–5-way Unrestricted
10 1.256 0.292 0.452 0.506 0.52 0.524
(1.0298) (0.72925) (1.0668) (1.1987) (1.2445) (1.2604)
20 2.474 1.128 1.818 2.176 2.396 2.668
(1.4919) (1.4183) (2.0798) (2.4701) (2.7273) (3.1403)
50 6.31 4.956 8.514 10.814 12.432 16.506
(2.2962) (2.9759) (4.5191) (5.3879) (5.9609) (7.1338)
aIn these results and others, the sample standard deviations reported are reported under averages; for the standard errors of the
averages, these deviations need to be divided by the square root of the simulation number,
√
500 = 22361.
3.2. Dual-Graft Liver Exchange
For simulations on dual-graft liver exchange, we use the South Korean population char-
acteristics (see Table III).12 The same statistics are used for the SLK-exchange simulations
in Appendix C of the Supplemental Material.13
We restrict our attention to left-lobe transplantation only, a procedure that is consid-
erably safer for the donor than right-lobe transplantation. The Korean adult liver left
lobe volume distribution’s moments are also given in Um et al. (2015) (see Table III).
We randomly set the graft volume of each donor using these parameters. We consider the
following simulation scenario in given order, as dual-graft liver transplants are considered
only if a suitable single-graft donor cannot be found:
1. If at least one of the donors of the patient is blood-type compatible, and his graft
volume is at least 40% of the liver volume of the patient, then the patient receives a
transplant directly from this compatible donor (denoted as “1-donor direct” scenario).
2. The remaining patients and their donors participate in an optimal “1-donor ex-
change” program. We use the same criterion as above to determine compatibility between
any patient and any donor in the 1-donor exchange pool. Specifically, patients form 2-way
(or 2&3-way) exchanges in which each patient receives a graft that is at least 40% of
her liver volume from a blood-type compatible donor of another patient in the same ex-
change.
3. The remaining patients and their coupled donors are checked for dual-graft compat-
ibility. If a patient’s donors are blood-type compatible with her and the sum of the donors’
12There is a selection bias in using the gender distributions of who receive transplants and who donate,
instead of those of who need transplants and who volunteer to donate. We use the former in our simulations
because this is the best data publicly available and we did not want to speculate about the underlying gender
specific disease and behavioral donation models that generate the latter statistics.
13In generating patient populations, we assume that each patient is attached to two living donors. We de-
termine the blood type, gender, and height characteristics for patients and their donors independently and
randomly. Then, we use the following weight determination formula as a function of height: w = ahb, where
w is weight in kg, h is height in meters, and constants a and b are set as a = 2658, b = 192 for males and
a= 3279, b= 145 for females (Diverse Populations Collaborative Group (2005)). This is the best formula we
could find for a weight-height relationship in humans in this respect. This paper does not report confidence
intervals; therefore, we could not use a stochastic process to generate weights. The body surface area (BSA in
m2) of an individual is determined through the Mostellar formula given in Um et al. (2015) as BSA =
√
hw
6 , and
the liver volume (lv in ml) of Korean adults is determined through the estimated formula in Um et al. (2015)
as lv = 893485BSA− 439169.
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TABLE III
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DUAL-GRAFT LIVER-EXCHANGE
SIMULATIONS FROM SOUTH KOREAN POPULATIONa
Live-Liver Donation Recipients in 2010–2014
Female 1492 (34.55%)
Male 2826 (64.45%)
Total 4318 (100.0%)
Live-Liver Donors in 2010–2014
Female 1149 (26.61%)
Male 3169 (73.39%)
Total 4318 (100.0%)
Adult Height (cm.)
Female Mean: 157.4 Std Dev: 5.99
Male Mean: 170.7 Std Dev: 6.4
Liver Left Lobe Volume as Percentage of Whole
Mean: 34.7% Std Dev: 3.9%
Blood-Type Distribution
O 37%
A 33%
B 21%
AB 9%
aThis table reflects the parameters used in calibrating the simulations for
dual-graft liver exchange. We obtained the blood-type distribution for South
Korea from http://bloodtypes.jigsy.com/East_Asia-bloodtypes on 04/10/2016.
The South Korean adult height distribution’s mean and standard devia-
tion were obtained from the Korean Agency for Technology and Standards
(KATS) website http://sizekorea.kats.go.kr on 04/10/2016. The transplant data
were obtained from the Korean Network for Organ Sharing (KONOS) 2014
Annual Report, retrieved from https://www.konos.go.kr/konosis/index.jsp on
04/10/2016.
graft volumes is at least 40% of the patient’s liver volume, then the patient receives dual
grafts from her own donors (denoted as “2-donor direct” scenario).
4. Finally, the remaining patients and their donors participate in an optimal “2-donor
exchange” program. We use the same criterion as above to deem any pair of donors
dual-graft compatible with any patient. Specifically, patients form 2-way (or 2&3-way)
exchanges in which each patient receives two grafts that total to at least 40% of her liver
volume from two blood-type compatible donors, at least one of whom is paired with a
different patient in the same exchange.
Simulation results are reported in Table IV. For a population of n = 250 (in the last
six lines in the table), on average 141 patients remain without a transplant following 1-
donor direct transplant and 1-donor 2&3-way exchange modalities (as about 60 patients
receive transplants from a donor of theirs and an additional 49 patients receive 1-donor
exchange transplants as seen in the third line of n= 250). About 31% of these patients re-
ceive dual-graft transplants from their own donors under the 2-donor direct modality (i.e.,
around 435 patients receive 2-donor transplants from their own donors out of the 141 re-
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TABLE IV
DUAL-GRAFT LIVER-EXCHANGE SIMULATIONS
1-Donor 2-Donor 2-Donor
Exchange Direct Exchange
Population 1-Donor Number As % of Number As % of Number As % of
Size Direct Matched Entrants Matched Entrants Matched Entrants
50 12.048 2-way 3.92 10.33% 10.634 31.24% 4.64 19.83%
(3.0699) (2.7204) (2.8256) (2.6872)
2&3-way 5.066 13.35% 10.256 31.19% 6.278 27.74%
(3.4382) (2.8655) (3.6512)
Unrestricted 5.772 15.21% 10.016 31.12% 7.016 31.65%
(3.9799) (2.9232) (3.9965)
100 24.098 2-way 10.656 14.04% 20.45 31.34% 10.028 22.39%
(4.4699) (4.2073) (4.3129) (3.9322)
2&3-way 14.452 19.04% 18.884 30.73% 13.566 31.87%
(5.6152) (4.4201) (5.2947)
Unrestricted 17.754 23.39% 17.88 30.75% 14.284 35.47%
(6.4827) (4.39.32) (5.373)
250 59.998 2-way 35.032 18.44% 48.818 31.50% 26.096 24.58%
(6.9937) (7.5297) (7.1265) (5.8167)
2&3-way 49.198 25.89% 43.476 30.88% 34.796 35.75%
(10.37) (7.1942) (8.2052)
Unrestricted 60.672 31.93% 39.744 30.73% 34.684 38.71%
(11.127) (7.0446) (7.8363)
maining). An additional 245% of these patients are matched in the 2-donor 2&3-way ex-
change modality (i.e., around 35 additional patients receive 2-donor transplants through
exchange out of the 141 remaining). This final figure corresponds to approximately 80%
of the 2-donor direct donation, and thus, the contribution of exchange to dual-graft trans-
plantation is highly significant. Moreover, the 2-donor 2&3-way exchange modality pro-
vides transplants for 705% of the number of patients who receive transplants through the
1-donor exchange modality. Therefore, the contribution of the 2-donor exchange modal-
ity to the overall number of transplants from exchange is also highly significant. Under
2&3-way exchanges, 2-donor exchange increases the total number of living-donor liver
transplants by about 23% by matching 139% of all patients.
Since pools evolve differently depending on which exchange-size constraint is used,
we also include three columns titled “As % of Entrants” in Table IV, which report pa-
tients who receive transplants under each modality (1-Donor Exchange, 2-Donor Direct,
or 2-Donor Exchange) as the percentage of the patients who are present in the pool for
the given transplant modality. Thus, the percentages in the last column can be used to
compare gains from 2-Donor exchange for different population sizes and exchange-size
constraints. For n = 250, by 2-way exchanges only, about 245% of the patients enter-
ing 2-Donor exchange receive transplants (i.e., 26 divided by 106, which is n = 250 mi-
nus the sum of patients matched in previous stages). By 2&3-way exchanges, 35.75% of
the patients entering 2-Donor exchange pool receive transplants, and in the absence of
exchange-size constraints, 38.7% of the patients entering 2-Donor exchange pool receive
transplants. Thus, unlike in lung exchange, most of the gains from exchange are captured
through 2&3-way exchanges in dual-graft liver exchange.
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4. A MODEL OF DUAL-DONOR ORGAN EXCHANGE
Our simulations in Section 3 show that exchange is potentially important in the con-
text of dual-donor organ transplants. We next present a simple theoretical model for its
analysis.
We assume that each patient, who has two living donors, can receive transplant organs
from her own donors if and only if both of them are blood-type compatible with the pa-
tient. That is, the two transplant organs are perfect complements for the patient. In our
benchmark model, we assume that there are no size or tissue-type compatibility require-
ments; the only compatibility requirement regards the blood type. This assumption helps
us to focus exclusively on the effect of the two-donor requirement on organ exchange, and
it best fits our application of dual-graft liver transplantation.14
Let B = {OABAB} be the set of blood types. We denote generic elements by
XYZ ∈ B. Let  be the partial order on blood types defined by X  Y if and only
if blood type X can donate to blood type Y . Figure 3 illustrates the partial order .15
Each patient participates in the exchange with two donors, which we refer to as a triple.16
The relevant information concerning the patient and her two donors can be summarized
as a triple of blood types X − Y −Z ∈ B3, where X is the blood type of the patient, and
Y and Z are the blood types of the donors. We will refer to each element in B3 as a triple
type such that the order of the donors has no relevance. For example, an O patient with a
pair of A and B donors counts as both a triple of type O−A−B and also a triple of type
O −B−A.
DEFINITION 1: An exchange pool is a vector of nonnegative integers E = {n(X − Y −
Z) :X −Y −Z ∈ B3} such that:
1. n(X −Y −Z)= n(X −Z −Y) for all X −Y −Z ∈ B3.
2. n(X −Y −Z)= 0 for all X −Y −Z ∈ B3 such that Y X and Z X .
The number n(X −Y −Z) stands for the number of participating X −Y −Z triples.
The first condition in the definition of an exchange pool corresponds to the assumption
that the order of the donors does not matter, that is, X − Y −Z and X −Z − Y repre-
FIGURE 3.—The partial order  on the set of blood types B = {OABAB}.
14When first introduced, the target population for lobar lung transplantation was pediatric patients. Since
the lung graft needs of children are not as voluminous as those of adults, the application of lobar lung trans-
plantation also fits our model well when the exchange pool consists of pediatric patients.
15For any XY ∈ B, X  Y if and only if there is a downward path from blood type X to blood type Y in
Figure 3.
16It is straightforward to integrate into our model patients who have one donor and who need one organ.
We can do so by treating these patients as part of a triple where a virtual donor is of the same blood type as
the patient.
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sent the same type. The second condition corresponds to the assumption that compatible
patient-donor triples do not participate in the exchange.
5. 2-WAY EXCHANGE
In this section, we assume that only 2-way exchanges are allowed. We characterize the
maximum number of patients receiving transplants for any given exchange pool E . We
also describe an algorithm that achieves this maximum.
A 2-way exchange is the simplest form of dual-donor organ exchange, involving two
triples exchanging one or both of their donors’ grafts, and it is the easiest to coordinate.
Thus, as a first step in our analysis, it is important to understand the structure and size
of optimal matchings with only 2-way exchanges. There are forty types of triples after ac-
counting for repetitions due to the reordering of donors. The following lemma simplifies
the problem substantially by showing that only six of these types may take part in 2-way
exchanges.17 All proofs are relegated to Appendices A, D, and E.
LEMMA 1: In any given exchange pool E , the only types that could be part of a 2-way
exchange are A−Y −B and B−Y −A where Y ∈ {OAB}.
The six types of triples in Lemma 1 are such that every A blood-type patient has at least
one B blood-type donor, and every B blood-type patient has at least one A blood-type
donor. Therefore, A blood-type patients can only take part in a 2-way exchange with B
blood-type patients, and vice versa. Furthermore, if they participate in a 2-way exchange,
the A−A−B and B−B−A types must exchange exactly one donor; the A−B−B and
B −A−A types must exchange both donors; and the A− O − B and B −O −A types
might exchange one or two donors.
We refer to the six types in Lemma 1 as essential types and summarize the possible 2-way
exchanges between them as the edges of the graph in Figure 4.
We next present a matching algorithm that maximizes the number of transplants
through 2-way exchanges. The algorithm sequentially maximizes three subsets of 2-way
exchanges:
ALGORITHM 1—Sequential Matching Algorithm for 2-Way Exchanges:
Step 1: Match the maximum number of A−A− B and B − B −A types.18 Match the
maximum number of A−B−B and B−A−A types.
FIGURE 4.—Possible 2-way exchanges.
17While only six of forty types can participate in 2-way exchanges, nearly half of the patient populations in
our simulations belong to these types due to very high rates of blood types A and B in Japan and South Korea.
18That is, match min{n(A−A−B)n(B−B−A)} type A−A−B triples with min{n(A−A−B)n(B−
B−A)} type B−B−A triples.
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FIGURE 5.—The optimal 2-way sequential matching algorithm.
Step 2: Match the maximum number of A−O−B types with any subset of the remain-
ing B − B − A and B − A − A types. Match the maximum number of B − O − A types
with any subset of the remaining A−A−B and A−B−B types.
Step 3: Match the maximum number of the remaining A−O−B and B−O−A types.
Figure 5 graphically illustrates the pairwise exchanges that are carried out at each step
of the sequential matching algorithm. The mechanics of this algorithm are very intuitive
and based on optimizing the flexibility offered by blood-type O donors. Initially, the opti-
mal use of triples endowed with blood-type O donors is not clear, and for Step 1 they are
“put on hold.” In this first step, as many triples as possible are matched without using any
triple endowed with a blood-type O donor. By Step 2, the optimal use of triples endowed
with blood-type O donors is revealed. In this step, as many triples as possible are matched
with each other by using only one blood-type O donor in each exchange. And finally in
Step 3, as many triples as possible are matched with each other by using two blood-type
O donors in each exchange.
The next theorem shows the optimality of Algorithm 1 and characterizes the maximum
number of transplants through 2-way exchanges.
THEOREM 1: Given an exchange pool E , Algorithm 1 maximizes the number of 2-way
exchanges. The maximum number of patients receiving transplants through 2-way exchanges
is 2 min{N1N2N3N4} where
N1 = n(A−A−B)+ n(A−O −B)+ n(A−B−B)
N2 = n(A−O −B)+ n(A−B−B)+ n(B−B−A)+ n(B−O −A)
N3 = n(A−A−B)+ n(A−O −B)+ n(B−O −A)+ n(B−A−A)
N4 = n(B−B−A)+ n(B−O −A)+ n(B−A−A)
Figure 6 depicts the sets of triple types whose market populations are N1, N2, N3,
and N4.
6. LARGER-SIZE EXCHANGES
We have seen that when only 2-way exchanges are allowed, every 2-way exchange must
involve exactly one A and one B blood-type patient. The following lemma generalizes this
observation to K-way exchanges for arbitrary K ≥ 2. In particular, every K-way exchange
must involve an A and a B blood-type patient, but if K ≥ 3, then it might also involve O
blood-type patients.
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FIGURE 6.—Potential bottleneck groups for maximum number of 2-way exchanges.
LEMMA 2: Fix E and letK ≥ 2. Then, the only types that could be part of aK-way exchange
are O−Y −A, O−Y −B, A−Y −B, and B−Y −A where Y ∈ {OAB}. Furthermore,
every K-way exchange must involve an A and a B blood-type patient.
In kidney-exchange pools, O patients with A donors are much more numerous than
their opposite type pairs, A patients with O donors. That is because O patients with A
donors arrive for exchange all the time, while A patients with O donors only arrive if
there is tissue-type incompatibility between them (as otherwise the donor is compatible
and donates directly to the patient). This empirical observation is caused by the blood-
type compatibility structure. In general, patients with less-sought-after blood-type donors
relative to their own blood type become in excess and plentiful as the exchange pool
grows in size. A similar situation will also occur in dual-donor organ exchange pools.
For kidney-exchange models, Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2007) made an explicit long-
run assumption regarding this asymmetry. We will make a corresponding assumption for
dual-donor organ exchange below. However, our assumption will be milder, as it will be
imposed only for two types of triples rather than all triple types with less-sought-after
donor blood types than their patients.
DEFINITION 2: An exchange pool E satisfies the long-run assumption if for every feasi-
ble matching in the absence of exchange-size restrictions, there is at least one O −O −A
and one O −O −B type that do not take part in any exchange.
Suppose that the exchange pool E satisfies the long-run assumption and μ is a matching
composed of any size exchanges. The long-run assumption ensures that we can create a
new matching μ′ from μ by replacing every O −A−A or O −A−B type taking part in
an exchange with an unmatched O−O−A type, and every O−B−B type taking part in
an exchange by an unmatched O −O − B type. Then, the new matching μ′ is composed
of the same size exchanges as μ, and it induces the same number of transplants as μ.
Furthermore, the only O blood-type patients matched under μ′ belong to the triples of
types O −O −A or O −O −B.
Let K¯ ≥ 2 be the maximum allowed exchange size. Consider the problem of finding
an optimal matching, that is, one that maximizes the number of transplants when only
2     K¯-way exchanges are feasible. By the above paragraph, for any optimal matching
μ, we can construct another optimal matching μ′ in which the only triples with O blood-
type patients matched under μ′ are of types O−O−A or O−O−B. We summarize this
observation as the following lemma:
LEMMA 3: Let K¯ ≥ 2 be the maximum allowed exchange size and let the exchange pool E
satisfy the long-run assumption. Then, there exists an optimal matching exclusively involving
the two types O−O−A, O−O−B and the six essential typesA−Y −B, B−Y −A where
Y ∈ {OAB}.
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Also observe that, since the numbers of type O − O − A and type O − O − B triples
are nonbinding by the long-run assumption, an optimal matching can be characterized
just in terms of the numbers of the six essential types. In the next subsection, we use
this approach to describe an algorithm that achieves the maximum number of transplants
when K¯ = 3.19
6.1. 2-&3-Way Exchanges
We continue our analysis with a characterization of the types that can be part of a 3-
way exchange. It turns out that ruling out the types O − A − A and O − B − B in the
construction of an optimal matching is without loss of generality for the case of 3-way
exchange. Not only can these triples not be matched under an optimal matching, they
cannot be part of any 3-way exchange.
LEMMA 4: Given an exchange pool E , triples of types O − A − A or O − B − B cannot
participate in any 3-way exchange.
Thus, the only types that can participate in a 3-way exchange are O−O−A, O−O−B,
O −A−B, and the six essential types A−Y −B, B−Y −A where Y ∈ {OAB}.
For expositional simplicity, next we describe a collection of 2- and 3-way exchanges
divided into three groups. We show in Lemma 6 in Appendix A that one can restrict
attention to these exchanges when constructing an optimal matching.
DEFINITION 3: Given an exchange pool E , a matching is in simplified form if it consists
of exchanges in the following three groups:
Group 1: 2-way exchanges exclusively involving types A−A−B, A−B−B, B−B−A,
and B − A − A. These exchanges are represented in Figure 7 by a regular (i.e., non-
bold/nondotted end) edge between two of these types.
Group 2: 3-way exchanges exclusively involving types A−A−B, A−B−B, B−B−A,
and B − A − A represented in Figure 7 by an edge with one dotted and one nondotted
end. A 3-way exchange in this group consists of two triples of the type at the dotted end
and one triple of the type at the nondotted end.
FIGURE 7.—Three groups of 2- and 3-way exchanges.
19Without additional structure, finding an optimal matching for fixed K¯ ≥ 3 is a computationally hard prob-
lem in the sense that it is NP-complete (Abraham, Blum, and Sandholm (2007)). In contrast, exploiting the
structure imposed above, we will provide a polynomial-time algorithm for K¯ = 3 in the next subsection and for
K¯ = 6 in Appendix E of the Supplemental Material.
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Group 3: 3-way exchanges involving two of the types A−A−B, A−O−B, A−B−B,
B−B−A, B−O−A, B−A−A, and one of the types O−O−A, O−O−B, O−A−B.
These exchanges are represented in Figure 7 by a bold edge between the former two
types.20
We will show that when the long-run assumption is satisfied, the following matching
algorithm maximizes the number of transplants through 2- and 3-way exchanges. The
algorithm sequentially maximizes three subsets of exchanges:
ALGORITHM 2—Sequential Matching Algorithm for 2- and 3-Way Exchanges:
Step 1: Carry out group 1, group 2 exchanges in Figure 7 among types A − A − B,
A−B−B, B−B−A, and B−A−A to maximize the number of transplants subject to
the following constraints (∗):
1. Leave at least a total min{n(A−A−B)+n(A−B−B)n(B−O−A)} of A−A−B
and A−B−B types unmatched.
2. Leave at least a total min{n(B−B−A)+n(B−A−A)n(A−O−B)} of B−B−A
and B−A−A types unmatched.
Step 2: Carry out the maximum number of 3-way exchanges in Figure 7 involving A−
O − B types and the remaining B − B − A or B − A − A types. Similarly carry out the
maximum number of 3-way exchanges involving B−O −A types and the remaining A−
A−B or A−B−B types.21
Step 3: Carry out the maximum number of 3-way exchanges in Figure 7 involving the
remaining A−O −B and B−O −A types.22
Figure 8 graphically illustrates the 2- and 3-way exchanges that are carried out at each
step of the sequential matching algorithm. The intuition for our second algorithm is
slightly more involved. When only 2-way exchanges are allowed, the only perk of a blood-
type O donor is in his flexibility to provide a transplant organ to either an A or a B patient.
When 3-way exchanges are also allowed, a blood-type O donor has an additional perk: He
FIGURE 8.—The optimal 2- and 3-way sequential matching algorithm.
20There are five exchanges represented by bold edges in Figure 7. Four of these exchanges involve only one
triple with an O donor. For those exchanges, the third triple of the 3-way exchange is uniquely defined either of
type O−O−A or of type O−O−B. The fifth exchange represented by a bold edge in Figure 7 has two triples
with an O donor each. For this exchange, the third triple can be of any of the types O −O −A, O −O −B, or
O −A−B.
21For each of these 3-way exchanges, the third triple is uniquely defined either of type O−O−A or of type
O −O −B.
22For these exchanges, the third triple could be of any of the types O −O −A, O −O −B, or O −A−B.
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can help save an additional patient of blood type O, provided that the patient already has
one donor of blood type O. For example, a triple of type A−O −B can be paired with a
triple of type B−B−A to save one additional triple of type O−O−A. Since each patient
of type A − O − B is in need of a patient of either type B − B − A or type B − A − A
to save an extra patient through the 3-way exchange, the maximization in Step 1 has to
be constrained. Otherwise a 3-way exchange would be sacrificed for a 2-way exchange,
reducing the number of transplants. The rest of the mechanics are similar between the
two algorithms. For expositional purposes, we present the subalgorithm that solves the
constrained optimization in Step 1 in Appendix D of the Supplemental Material. The
following theorem shows the optimality of Algorithm 2.
THEOREM 2: Given an exchange pool E satisfying the long-run assumption, Algorithm 2
maximizes the number of transplants through 2- and 3-way exchanges.
6.2. Necessity and Sufficiency of 6-Way Exchanges
Although larger exchanges are logistically harder to organize, it is of theoretical inter-
est to understand their potential role in dual-donor organ exchange. We next identify the
types that can participate in an optimal matching in the absence of constraints on ex-
change size. In this setting, the only blood-type O patients that can be part of an optimal
matching are of types O −O −A or O −O −B.
LEMMA 5: Given an exchange pool E satisfying the long-run assumption, O − A − A,
O − A − B, and O − B − B type triples are never matched in an optimal matching in the
absence of exchange-size constraints.
Thus, the only types that can participate in an optimal exchange are O − O − A, O −
O −B, and the six essential types A−Y −B, B−Y −A where Y ∈ {OAB}.
In our next result, we show that restricting attention to 2–6-way exchanges is sufficient
to maximize the number of transplants through exchange. As part of the proof of this
result, given in Appendix E of the Supplemental Material, we also provide an algorithm
that achieves the maximum.
THEOREM 3: Suppose that the exchange pool E satisfies the long-run assumption and ex-
change sizes are unrestricted. Then there exists an optimal matching that consists of exchanges
no larger than 6-way.
The following example shows that using 6-way exchanges is not only sufficient, but also
necessary to find an optimal matching for some exchange pools.
EXAMPLE 1: Consider an exchange pool with one triple of type A−O −B, two triples
of type B − O − A, and three triples of O − O − B.23 Observe that all patients can re-
ceive two transplant organs of their blood type. Therefore, all patients are matched under
an optimal matching. With three blood-type O patients and six blood-type O donors, all
blood-type O organs must be transplanted to blood-type O patients (for otherwise not
23For the example to use the long-run assumption, we can assume there are also one additional O −O −B
triple and an O−O−A triple. In this case, at least one O−O−B and this O−O−A triple remain unmatched
in every matching.
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FIGURE 9.—An optimal matching for the pool in Example 1 always consists of a single 6-way exchange.
each patient would receive a transplant). This in turn implies that the two blood-type A
organs must be transplanted to the only blood-type A patient. Hence, the triple of type
A−O −B should be in the same exchange as the two triples of type B−O −A. Equiva-
lently, all triples with a non-O patient should be part of the same exchange. But patients
of O − O − B triples each are in need of an additional blood-type O donor, and thus
O − O − B triples should also be part of the same exchange. Hence, 6-way exchange is
necessary to match all patients and obtain an optimal matching (see Figure 9).
Our simulations in Section 3 suggest that while the total number of transplants from
exchanges larger than 3-way can be significant and approach those from 2-way and 3-way
exchanges combined for the application of lung exchange, they are relatively modest for
the application of dual-graft liver exchange. The contrast between the two sets of simu-
lations suggests that the presence of size compatibility increases the role of larger than
3-way exchanges. Our theoretical results in the absence of size compatibility (and their
proofs) provide some insight for the relatively modest role of larger than 3-way exchanges
for the simulations on dual-graft liver exchange. Proposition 2 in Appendix E shows that
when there are no exchange-size constraints, an optimal matching can be constructed us-
ing only 2- and 3-way exchanges provided that there are no blood-type O patients in the
pool. Moreover, by Lemma 5, triples of type O − O − A and O − O − B are the only
triples with blood-type O patients, who can be matched in an optimal matching. Each
triple of these types requires a second O donor, which can only be supplied by A−O−B
or B − O − A types. Thus, all welfare gains from exchanges beyond 3-way come from
the ability of matching additional O − O − A and O − O − B types through the utiliza-
tion of A − O − B and B − O − A types. In the absence of exchange-size constraints, a
triple of O − O − A or O − O − B can be appended to any exchange for each triple of
A−O−B or B−O−A that is part of the exchange (see, e.g., Figure 9 where three types
of O − O − B are appended to three types of A − O − B or B − O − A). When only 2-
and 3-way exchanges are feasible, only one triple of types O−O−A or O−O−B can be
appended to any 2-way exchange that includes one or two triples of types A−O −B and
B −O −A. But that means that larger than 3-way exchanges can only increase the total
number of transplants by the difference between (1) the maximum number of A−O −B
and B − O − A types that can be matched in the absence of exchange-size constraints
and (2) the maximum number of distinct 2-way exchanges that includes A − O − B or
B −O −A types when no exchange can be larger than 3-way. The two types A−O − B
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and B−O−A are essential and they already play a key role under 2- and 3-way exchange.
Hence the difference cannot be very high, limiting the role of larger than 3-way exchanges
in our theoretical model as well as in our application of dual-graft liver exchange.
7. CONCLUSION
For any organ with the possibility of living-donor transplantation, living-donor organ
exchange is also medically feasible. Despite the introduction and practice of transplant
procedures that require two donors, organ exchange in this context is neither discussed in
the literature nor implemented in practice. We propose dual-donor organ exchange as a
new transplantation modality, focusing on the following three transplantation procedures:
dual-graft liver transplantation, bilateral living-donor lobar lung transplantations, and si-
multaneous liver-kidney transplantation. We simulate the potential gains from dual-donor
exchanges for these applications. We also formulate an analytical model of dual-donor or-
gan exchange and introduce optimal exchange mechanisms under various logistical con-
straints.
Analytically, dual-donor organ exchange is a more challenging problem than kidney
exchange since each patient is in need of two compatible donors who are perfect comple-
ments. Exploiting the structure induced by the blood-type compatibility requirement for
organ transplantation, we introduce optimal exchange mechanisms under various logis-
tical constraints. Abstracting away from additional medical compatibility considerations
such as size compatibility and tissue-type compatibility, our analytical model best captures
the specifics of dual-graft liver transplantation. For our calibrated simulations, however,
we take into account these additional compatibility requirements (whenever relevant) for
each application. Through these simulations, we show that the marginal contribution of
exchange to living-donor organ transplantation is very substantial. For example, adopt-
ing 2-way exchanges alone has the potential to increase the number of living-donor lung
transplants by 78.5% in Japan (see Table II).
The potential of an organized exchange for each medical application in a given society
will likely depend on the following factors:
1. availability and expertise in the required transplantation technique;
2. prominence of living donation;
3. legal and cultural attitudes towards living-donor organ exchanges.
First and foremost, transplantation procedures that require two living donors are highly
specialized and so far they are available only in a few countries. For example, the practice
of living-donor lobar lung transplantation is reported in the literature only in the United
States and Japan. Hence, the availability of the required transplantation technology limits
the potential markets for applications of dual-donor organ exchange. Next, organized ex-
change is more likely to succeed in an environment where living-donor organ transplanta-
tion is the norm rather than an exception. While living donation of kidneys is widespread
in several western countries, it is much less common for organs that require more inva-
sive surgeries, such as the liver and the lung. Since all our applications rely on these more
invasive procedures, this second factor further limits the potential of organized exchange
in the western world. In contrast, this factor is very favorable in several Asian counties
and countries with predominantly Muslim populations, where living donors are the pri-
mary source of transplant organs. Finally, the concept of living-donor organ exchange is
not equally accepted throughout the world, and it is not even legal in some countries. For
example, organ exchanges are outlawed under the German transplant law. Indeed, it was
unclear whether kidney exchanges violate the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 in
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the U.S. until Congress passed the Charlie W. Norwood Living Organ Donation Act of
2007, clarifying them as legal. Clearly, dual-donor organ exchanges cannot flourish in a
country unless they comply with the laws.
Based on these factors, we foresee the strongest potential for organized exchange for
dual-graft liver transplantation in South Korea, for lobar lung transplantation in Japan,
and for simultaneous liver-kidney transplantation in South Korea and in Turkey.
APPENDIX A: PROOFS OF LEMMAS 1, 2, 4, AND 5 AND THEOREMS 1 AND 2
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: Since AB blood-type patients are compatible with their donors,
there are no AB blood-type patients in the exchange pool. This implies that no triple with
an AB blood-type donor can be part of a 2-way exchange, since AB blood-type donors
can only donate to AB blood-type patients.
We next argue that no triple with an O blood-type patient can be part of a 2-way ex-
change. To see this, suppose that X−Y −Z and O−Y ′ −Z′ take part in a 2-way exchange.
If X exchanges her Y donor, then Y can donate to O so Y = O. If X does not exchange
her Y donor, then Y can donate to X . In either case, Y X . Similarly, Z X , implying
that X −Y −Z is a compatible triple, a contradiction.
From what is shown above, the only triples that can be part of a 2-way exchange are
those where the patient’s blood type is in {AB} and the donors’ blood types are in
{OAB}. If we further exclude the compatible combinations and repetitions due to re-
ordering the donors, we are left with the six triple types stated in the lemma. It is easy
to verify that triples of these types can indeed participate in 2-way exchanges (see Fig-
ure 4). Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: Let N denote the maximum number of 2-way exchanges.
Since each such exchange results in two transplants, the maximum number of transplants
through 2-way exchanges is 2N . We will prove the theorem in two parts.
Proof of “N ≤ min{N1N2N3N4}”: Since each 2-way exchange involves an A blood-
type patient, we have that N ≤ N1. Since A − A − B types can only be part of a 2-way
exchange with B−B−A or B−O−A types, the number of 2-way exchanges that involve
an A−A− B type is bounded above by n(B − B −A)+ n(B −O −A). Therefore, the
number of 2-way exchanges involving an A blood-type patient is less than or equal to this
upper bound plus the number of A − O − B and A − B − B types, that is, N ≤ N2. The
inequalities N ≤N3 and N ≤N4 follow from symmetric arguments, switching the roles of
A and B blood types.
Proof of “N ≥ min{N1N2N3N4}”: We next show that the matching algorithm
achieves min{N1N2N3N4} exchanges. This implies N ≥ min{N1N2N3N4}. Since
N ≤ min{N1N2N3N4}, we conclude that N = min{N1N2N3N4}, and hence, the
matching algorithm is optimal.
Case 1. “N1 = min{N1N2N3N4}”: The inequalities N1 ≤ N2, N1 ≤ N3, and N1 ≤ N4
imply that
n(A−A−B)≤ n(B−B−A)+ n(B−O −A)
n(A−B−B)≤ n(B−A−A)+ n(B−O −A)
n(A−A−B)+ n(A−B−B)≤ n(B−B−A)+ n(B−A−A)+ n(B−O −A)
Therefore, after the maximum number of A−A−B and B−B−A types and the maxi-
mum number of A−B−B and B−A−A types are matched in the first step, there are
1666 H. ERGIN, T. SÖNMEZ, AND M. U. ÜNVER
enough B−O−A types to accommodate any remaining A−A−B and A−B−B types
in the second step.
Since N1 ≤N4, there are at least n(A−O − B) triples with B blood-type patients who
are not matched to A−A− B and A− B − B types in the first two steps. Therefore, all
A − O − B triples are matched to triples with B blood-type patients in the second and
third steps. The resulting matching involves N1 exchanges, since all A blood-type patients
take part in a 2-way exchange.
Case 2. “N2 = min{N1N2N3N4}”: Since N2 ≤ N1, we have n(A − A − B) ≥ n(B −
B − A) + n(B − O − A). Therefore, all B − B − A types are matched to A − A − B
types in the first step. Similarly, N2 ≤ N4 implies that n(A − O − B) + n(A − B − B) ≤
n(B − A − A). Therefore, all A − B − B types are matched to B − A − A types in the
first step. In the second step, there are no remaining B − B − A types, but there are
enough B − A− A types to accommodate all A − O − B types. Similarly, in the second
step, there are no remaining A− B − B types, but there are enough A−A− B types to
accommodate all B − O − A types. There are no more exchanges in the third step. The
resulting matching involves N2 2-way exchanges.
The cases where N3 and N4 are the minimizers follow from symmetric arguments ex-
changing the roles of A and B blood types. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: As argued in the proof of Lemma 1, no AB blood-type patient or
donor can be part of a K-way exchange. Therefore, the only triples that can be part of a
K-way exchange are those where its patient’s and its donors’ blood types are in {OAB}.
After excluding the compatible combinations, we are left with the triple types listed above.
Take any K-way exchange. Since every triple type listed above has at least an A or a
B blood-type donor, the K-way exchange involves an A or a B blood-type patient. If it
involves an A blood-type patient, then that patient brings in a B blood-type donor, so it
must also involve a B blood-type patient. If it involves a B blood-type patient, then that
patient brings in an A blood-type donor, so it must also involve an A blood-type patient.
It is trivial to see that all types in the hypothesis can feasibly participate in exchange in a
suitable exchange pool.24 Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 4: Suppose that there exists a 3-way exchange that matches an O −
X − X type triple for any X ∈ {AB}. This triple’s O patient necessarily receives grafts
from two O donors in this exchange. Then there exist two triples each with a single O
donor in the same exchange, as X −O−O types are compatible and are not present in E .
By Lemma 2, there should be an A and a B patient in any exchange. Thus, the other
two triples that participate in this 3-way exchange are necessarily of types A−O −B and
B−O−A, respectively (as types with AB patients or donors and A−O−O, B−O−O,
A−O −A, and B−O −B types do not participate in exchange by Lemma 2). However,
O−X−X , A−O−B, and B−O−A types cannot form a feasible 3-way exchange among
each other. This contradicts the existence of such a 3-way exchange. Hence, O −X −X
types cannot participate in a 3-way exchange. Q.E.D.
24We already demonstrated the possibility of exchanges regarding triples (of the types in the hypothesis of
the lemma) with A and B blood-type patients in Lemma 1. An O−A−A triple can be matched in a four-way
exchange with A−O −B, A−O −B, B −A−A triples (symmetric argument holds for O −B−B). On the
other hand, an O −A−B triple can be matched in a 3-way exchange with A−O −B and B −O −A triples.
An O −O −A or an O −O −B type can be used instead of O −A−B in the previous example.
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Before proving Theorem 2, we first state and prove two lemmas that will be used in
proving Theorem 2. Lemma 6 below states that, under the long-run assumption, one can
restrict attention to the exchanges in Definition 3 to construct an optimal matching.
LEMMA 6: Suppose that the exchange pool E satisfies the long-run assumption, and only
2- and 3-way exchanges are allowed. Then, there is an optimal matching that is in simplified
form.
PROOF: We first show that if a matching μ includes an exchange not represented in
Figure 7, then there is a matching μ′ that induces at least as many transplants and includes
one more exchange of the kinds included in Figure 7. To see this, take any exchange in μ
not represented as an edge in Figure 7. The exchange must be at most 3-way since larger
exchanges are not allowed. Furthermore, by Lemma 2, the exchange includes two types
A−Y −Z and B−Y ′ −Z′ that are vertices of Figure 7. To create the matching μ′, we first
undo this exchange in μ, then create a weakly larger exchange that involves unmatched
types and is represented as an edge in Figure 7.
Case 1. “There is a bold edge between the types A−Y −Z and B−Y ′−Z′ in Figure 7”:
Then we create the 3-way exchange that corresponds to that bold edge.
If there is no bold edge between A − Y − Z and B − Y ′ − Z′ in Figure 7, then these
types cannot be A−A−B and B−B−A, because the only allowable exchange involving
A−A− B and B − B −A is the 2-way exchange included in Figure 7. By an analogous
argument, these types also cannot be A−B−B and B−A−A. This leaves out two more
cases:
Case 2. “A−Y −Z =A−A−B and B−Y ′ −Z = B−A−A”: The only allowable
exchange involving these two types not represented in Figure 7 is the 3-way exchange
where the third participant is A−O −B. In this case, we create the 3-way exchange that
corresponds to the bold edge between the unmatched A−O −B and B−A−A types.
Case 3. “A−Y −Z =A−B−B and B−Y ′ −Z = B−B−A”: We omit the argument
for this case, since it is symmetric to Case 2.
By the finiteness of the problem, there is an optimal matching μ that is not necessarily
in simplified form. By what we have shown above, we can construct an optimal matching
μ′ that is in simplified form from the matching μ by iteratively replacing the exchanges
that are excluded from Figure 7 with those that are included in it. Q.E.D.
LEMMA 7: Suppose that the exchange pool E satisfies the long-run assumption and n(A−
A−B)+n(A−B−B) > n(B−O−A). If a matching μ is in simplified form and includes
at least one 3-way exchange involving an A−O − B and a B −O −A type, then there is a
matching μ′ such that: (i) μ′ is in simplified form, (ii) μ′ induces at least as many transplants
as μ, and (iii) μ′ includes one less 3-way exchange involving anA−O−B and a B−O−A
type compared to μ.
PROOF: To construct μ′, we first undo exactly one 3-way exchange in μ that involves
an A−O − B and a B −O −A type. In the following, we will call these A−O − B and
B−O −A types, “the A−O −B type” and “the B−O −A type.” To finish constructing
μ′, we consider five cases:
Case 1. “There is an unmatched A−A−B or A−B−B type under μ”: Then create
a 3-way exchange involving that type and the B−O −A type.
If we do not fall into Case 1, then all A − A − B and A − B − B types are matched
under μ; but since n(A−A−B)+n(A−B−B) > n(B−O−A), they cannot all be part
of a 3-way exchange with B−O −A types. That leaves four more cases:
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Case 2. “An A−A− B and a B − B −A type are part of a 2-way exchange under μ”:
Then undo that 2-way exchange and create two new 3-way exchanges, one involving the
unmatched A−A−B type and the B−O−A type, and another involving the unmatched
B−B−A type and the A−O −B type.
Case 3. “Two A−A−B types and a B−A−A type are part of a 3-way exchange under
μ”: Then undo that 3-way exchange and create two new 3-way exchanges, one involving
one of the two unmatched A−A−B types and the B−O−A type, and another involving
the unmatched B−A−A type and the A−O −B type.
Case 4. “An A− B −B and a B −A−A type are part of a 2-way exchange under μ”:
Then undo that 2-way exchange and create two new 3-way exchanges, one involving the
unmatched A−B−B type and the B−O−A type, and another involving the unmatched
B−A−A type and the A−O −B type.
Case 5. “An A−B−B type and two B−B−A types are part of a 3-way exchange under
μ”: Then undo that 3-way exchange and create two new 3-way exchanges, one involving
the unmatched A−B−B type and the B−O−A type, and another involving one of the
two unmatched B−B−A types and the A−O −B type.
In each of the five cases considered above, the newly constructed matching μ′ satisfies
(i)–(iii) in Lemma 7. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2: Define the numbers KA and KB by
KA := n(A−O −B)− n(B−B−A)− n(B−A−A)
KB := n(B−O −A)− n(A−A−B)− n(A−B−B)
We will consider two cases depending on the signs of KA and KB.
Case 1. “max{KAKB} ≥ 0”:
Suppose, without loss of generality, that KA ≤ KB. Then, KB = max{KAKB} ≥ 0. This
implies, by the definition of KB, that n(B − O − A) ≥ n(A − A − B) + n(A − B − B).
Therefore, all A−A− B and A− B − B types participate in 3-way exchanges with B −
O −A types in Step 2 of the algorithm.
The number of A−O −B types that are not matched in Step 2 is given by
n(A−O −B)− min{n(B−B−A)+ n(B−A−A)n(A−O −B)}
= max{n(A−O −B)− n(B−B−A)− n(B−A−A)0}
= max{KA0}
≤KB = n(B−O −A)− n(A−A−B)− n(A−B−B)
As a result, the number of A−O −B types that are not matched in Step 2 is less than or
equal to the number of B − O − A types that are not matched in Step 2. Therefore, all
A−O −B types participate in 3-way exchanges in Steps 2 and 3 of the algorithm.
We have shown that the algorithm creates at least 3 ×[n(A−A−B)+n(A−B−B)+
n(A − O − B)] transplants. Since each exchange consists of at most three participants
and must involve an A blood-type patient, this is also an upper bound on the number
of transplants through 2- and 3-way exchanges. Therefore, the outcome of the algorithm
must be optimal.
Case 2. “max{KAKB}< 0”:
By Lemma 6, there exists an optimal matching μ0 that is in simplified form. Since
KB < 0, we have n(A − A − B) + n(A − B − B) > n(B − O − A). Therefore, we can
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iteratively apply Lemma 7 to μ0 to obtain an optimal matching μ1 in simplified form that
does not include a 3-way exchange involving an A−O −B and a B−O −A type.
Let A denote the number of unmatched A−O −B types in μ1. Since KA < 0, that is,
n(B−B−A)+n(B−A−A)> n(A−O−B), there are more than A many participants
with B−B−A or B−A−A types who do not take part in an exchange with A−O −B
types in μ1. Choose an arbitrary A many of these B−B−A or B−A−A participants,
undo the exchanges they participate in under μ1, and create A new 3-way exchanges
involving these participants and the unmatched A−O −B types.
Similarly, let B denote the number of unmatched B −O −A types in μ1. Since KB <
0, i.e., n(A − A − B) + n(A − B − B) > n(B − O − A), there are more than B many
participants with A−A−B or A−B−B types who do not take part in an exchange with
B −O −A types in μ1. Choose an arbitrary B many of these A−A− B or A− B − B
participants, undo the exchanges they participate in under μ1, and create B new 3-way
exchanges involving these participants and the unmatched B−O −A types.
The new matching μ2 obtained from μ1 in the above manner is in simplified form.
Furthermore, μ2 induces at least as many transplants as μ1; therefore, it is also optimal.
Note also that under μ2, all A−O−B types take part in a 3-way exchange with B−B−A
or B−A−A types, and all B−O−A types take part in a 3-way exchange with A−A−B
or A−B−B types.
Let μ denote an outcome of the sequential matching algorithm described in the text.
Since KAKB < 0, the constraint (∗) in Step 1 becomes equivalent to:
1. Leave at least a total n(B−O −A) of A−A−B and A−B−B types unmatched.
2. Leave at least a total n(A−O −B) of B−B−A and B−A−A types unmatched.
Therefore, in Step 2 of the algorithm, all A−O−B types take part in a 3-way exchange
with B−B−A or B−A−A types, and all B−O−A types take part in a 3-way exchange
with A−A−B or A−B−B types. This implies that the total number of transplants from
exchanges involving A−O −B or B−O −A types is the same (= 3 × [n(A−O −B)+
n(B−O −A)]) for both matchings μ2 and μ.
The restriction of the matching μ2 to the 2- and 3-way exchanges represented as edges
among A − A − B, A − B − B, B − B − A, and B − A − A types in Figure 7 respects
the constraint (∗). Therefore, the total number of transplants in μ2 from exchanges not
involving A−O −B nor B−O −A types cannot exceed the total number of transplants
in Step 1 of the algorithm leading to μ. As a result, the total number of transplants under
μ is at least as large as the total number of transplants under μ2, implying that μ is also
optimal. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 5: Suppose there are no exchange-size constraints and there exists
an optimal matching μ that matches an O−X−Y type triple i where XY ∈ {AB} in E .
By the long-run assumption, there exist an O −O −X triple j and an O −O −Y triple k
that are unmatched in μ. We construct a new matching ν using μ by removing triple i and
inserting triples j and k as follows (see Figure 10):
(i) the patient who originally receives from the X donor of i in μ now receives from
the X donor of j in ν,
(ii) the patient who originally receives from the Y donor of i in μ now receives from
the Y donor of k in ν,
(iii) the two O donors who originally donate to the patient of i in μ now donate to the
patients of j and k in ν, respectively,
(iv) the O donors of j and k now donate to their own patients in ν, and
(v) the other donations in μ remain intact in ν.
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FIGURE 10.—The O −X −Y triple in μ in the left is replaced with an O −O −X triple and an O −O −Y
triple in ν in the right, which were originally unmatched in μ. Since triples with AB patients are absent in
the exchange pool, the patients that X and Y donors donate in μ should also be of blood types X and Y ,
respectively. Moreover, although it is depicted in the figure as if these donors donate to two different patients
in μ, when X = Y it could also be the case that they donate to the same patient.
The new matching ν is feasible and matches one more triple than μ, which in turn con-
tradicts the optimality of μ. Q.E.D.
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